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Crowding, Attention and Consciousness: In support of the Inference Hypothesis. 
Henry Taylor and Bilge Sayim 
Forthcoming in Mind and Language 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: [Crowding, Attention and 
Consciousness], which is forthcoming in Mind and Language. This article may be used for non-
commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. 
Abstract. 
One of the most important topics in current work on consciousness is what relationship it 
has to attention. Recently, one of the focuses of this debate has been on the phenomenon of 
identity crowding. Ned Block has claimed that identity crowding involves consciously 
perceiving an object that we are unable to pay attention to. Others have offered different 
interpretations, emphasising the role of cognitive inference over conscious perception. In 
this paper, we draw upon a range of empirical findings to argue against Block’s 
interpretation of the data. We also argue that current empirical evidence strongly supports 
one particular version of the inference hypothesis. Finally, we consider the additional 
evidence Block gives in favour of his view, and argue that it fails to establish his position. 
1. Identity Crowding 
One of the most hotly debated questions in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science is the relationship between attention and consciousness.1  One of the focal points of 
this debate is the phenomenon of ‘identity crowding’. Ned Block has argued that identity 
																																								 																				
1	See	Carrasco	(2011),	Van	Boxtel	et	al.	 (2010)	and	Kentridge	(2011)	for	surveys	of	work	 in	cognitive	science.	
See	Watzl	(2011)	and	Wu	(2014),	for	philosophical	surveys.	
		 2	
crowding provides an example of an object that is consciously seen but which we are unable 
to pay attention to. If Block is correct, this will be a decisive blow to many theorists (such as 
Mack and Rock 1998, Prinz 2012, Montemayor and Haladjian 2014 and Cohen et al. 2012) 
who argue that attention is necessary for consciousness, and it would confirm the view of 
other thinkers (e.g. Mole 2008, Jennings 2015, Li et al. 2002 and Koch and Tsuchiya 2007) 
who argue that consciousness is possible in the absence of attention. Furthermore, Block 
argues that we can have de re thoughts about an object that we are unable to attend to.2 This 
runs counter to the majority view in philosophical discussion of de re thought (e.g. Campbell 
2002, Levine 2010 and Tye 2009a, 2009b, 2010). For this reason, our assessment of identity 
crowding has important consequences throughout cognitive science, as well as philosophy 
of mind and language. 
In this paper, we offer an analysis of this debate. We firstly examine the phenomenon of 
identity crowding and the different interpretations of it that have been given (§1). Next, we 
draw upon a large body of empirical evidence to argue against Block’s interpretation of 
identity crowding (§2) and put forward a rival interpretation (§3). Finally, we consider 
additional arguments put forward in favour of Block’s view, and argue that they fail to 
establish Block’s conclusion (§4).  
																																								 																				
2	By	‘de	re	thoughts’	we	mean	demonstrative	thoughts,	thoughts	that	‘mentally	point’	to	objects.	
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Figure 1: An example of identity crowding. In the first row, an unflanked target is shown. The second row 
shows a ‘normal’ case of crowding and the third row the ‘identity’ crowded target (details see text). 	
Identity crowding is a particular variety of visual crowding (fig.1). When you fixate your 
gaze on the upper ‘+’ in fig.1, you will probably find that you are able to identify the letter to 
the right of it. This is a normal instance of non-crowded peripheral vision. ‘Crowding’ is an 
effect that occurs when target items are ‘flanked’ by other items. For example, when you 
fixate on the middle ‘+’ in fig. 1, you will most likely be unable to identify the middle letter 
in the array to the right of that ‘+’. This is a case of normal crowding. It occurs because the 
presence of the flanking letters disrupts the perception of the target letter (see Levi, 2008 for 
a survey). Crowding is not constrained to letters but occurs with a large range of other 
stimuli. 3 
There are various proposed explanations of crowding, and a large empirical 
literature dedicated to it (e.g. Herzog et al. (2015), Levi (2008), Pelli et al. (2004), Parkes et al. 
(2001), and Strasburger (2005)). Ned Block follows the view that crowding is due to 
‘excessive feature integration’, where the visual system is unable to differentiate which 
properties belong to the target, and which belong to the flankers, and the result is that in 
cases of normal crowding, one only sees a ‘messy’ texture (Block, 2013a, pp.171-2). The 
																																								 																				
3	Following	convention,	we	refer	to	the	middle	letter	as	the	‘target’	and	the	outer	two	letters	as	‘flankers’.		
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purpose of the present paper is not to contest this general approach to crowding, but to 
focus on a particular kind of crowding: identity crowding. 
The crucial case for our purposes is the bottom row in fig.1. When fixating the 
bottom ‘+’, most observers find that they are able to identify the target letter. We follow 
Block (2013a) in referring to this phenomenon as ‘identity crowding’. It occurs when the 
target is physically identical to the flankers. In this paper, our focus will be on the recent and 
highly controversial claim that identity crowding is a case where subjects are unable to direct 
attention to a target item, but can still consciously see that item (the item in question being 
the middle letter). We call this view the ‘conscious perception’ view.  
Block (2013a, 2013b and 2014) defends this view.4 Block’s case can be divided into 
two main points (each of which will be more thoroughly explained later in the paper). 
Firstly, he notes that subjects are usually able to detect identity crowded targets, 
discriminate them from the background (and from the flankers), identify them, and have de 
re thoughts about them. Block concludes from this that ‘it is difficult to see a rationale for 
denying that one can consciously see [the target]’ (2013a, p.175). Secondly, Block draws 
upon work based upon summary statistics, binding and ‘singular elements’ to argue that 
identity crowding is ‘sufficiently perceptual to involve consciously seeing identity-crowded 
objects’ (2013b, p.31).  
Views that oppose the conscious perception hypothesis offer a rival interpretation of 
identity crowding. These views all deny that subjects have a conscious experience of the 
middle item in identity crowding, and they explain subjects’ abilities in terms of some kind 
of cognitive inference, rather than conscious perception without attention. Such 
																																								 																				
4	Though	Block	grants	that	there	may	be	spatial	(as	opposed	to	object-based)	attention	to	it	(2013a,	p.173).	
		 5	
interpretations fit into a family that we call ‘inference views’, but this is only a loose label, as 
different versions of the view emphasise inference to very different extents. Bradley 
Richards (2013) claims that subjects unconsciously perceive the middle letter, but this 
unconscious perception is accompanied by a conscious judgement to the effect that there is an 
‘A’ (see fig.1), present. Henry Taylor (2013) suggests that the experience of the group of 
letters as a whole lacks the detail to represent the middle letter specifically, but that subjects 
are able to identify one of the flankers, and also identify that the group of letters as a whole 
is congruous and uniform. Taylor claims that subjects can use this information to infer that 
the target is the same as the flankers, and thus identify the target. Michael Tye (2014) claims 
that in the case of identity crowding, we only see the two flanking letters: ‘[w]hat your 
experience erroneously tells you is that there are two [letters] on the right, not three’ (2014 
p.156).  Then, when asked what the ‘middle’ letter is, subjects infer (based on the fact that 
they can only see two similar letters) that any letter there must be the same. 
Inference theorists and conscious perception theorists also differ on their 
interpretation of cases similar to identity crowding (e.g. fig. 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Identity crowded lines. Adapted from Intriligator and Cavanagh (2001). (Details see text).   
 
When subjects fix their gaze on the cross in fig.2, they typically find it difficult to 
direct attention toward each of the bars individually (Intriligator & Cavanagh, 2001). Block 
(2013a, p.175) claims that each individual bar is consciously seen. Inference theorists reject 
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this. Tye (2009a, 2009b and 2014) claims that one sees the collection of bars as a whole, 
without seeing each individual bar, and this experience allows subjects to infer properties of 
each individual bar. Taylor (2013) offers a similar view to Tye, though he emphasises the 
role of properties of the group such as congruity and uniformity in allowing subjects to infer 
properties of individual bars. Richards’ (2013) view is again similar, though he emphasises 
the role of unconscious perception. 
Importantly, Block agrees with these opponents that perception and inference play at 
least some role in identity crowding (Block, 2013b, p.31). The difference is that Block (unlike 
his opponents) thinks that there is conscious perception of the target in the absence of 
attention in cases of identity crowding and in cases like fig.2. Block puts forth this claim with 
different strengths in different places, occasionally he seems to say that the target letter in 
identity crowding cases is always consciously seen, though it escapes attention (2013a, 
p.175), whilst at other times he claims that it is consciously seen ‘at least in some cases’ 
(2013b, p.31). Each version of the view raises its own distinctive questions. For example, if 
the claim is that the middle letter is only seen sometimes, then we require an account of what 
is going on in the cases where it is not seen; whilst no such need arises when the claim is that 
the letter is always seen. In any case, in this paper, we will argue that Block’s arguments fall 
short of showing that the target is consciously seen, and that all of the data can be 
accommodated without needing to make this claim. We further claim that in cases of 
identity crowding, we have good reason to deny that the target is ever consciously seen.  
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2. Evidence Against Conscious Seeing in Identity Crowding. 
One core part of Block’s case against both Tye and Taylor is that they do not support their 
views with empirical evidence (Block, 2013b, pp.36-37 and 2014).  These complaints are fair, 
Block’s opponents have by and large relied on intuition and introspection.  In this section 
and the next, we remedy this: we review evidence related to the phenomenon of ‘grouping’ 
in crowding, and the relation of conscious target perception to the abilities to direct attention 
to the target. We argue that both kinds of evidence oppose Block’s ‘conscious perception’ 
view. 
2.1 Similarity and grouping in crowding 
To Block, the conscious perception of the target in identity crowding is what explains 
subjects’ abilities to identify, discriminate etc. the target. Of course, Block does not base his 
case on normal crowding (e.g. the middle row of fig.1) because in these cases subjects are not 
able to identify, discriminate etc. the target (again, given that crowding is sufficiently 
strong), so there is no positive reason to claim that the target is consciously seen.  In this 
section, we draw upon work on grouping to argue that we have more reason to doubt that 
the target is consciously perceived in the case of identity crowding than in the case of normal 
crowding! Given these findings, we have reason to doubt Block’s view.  
The main feature of (normal) crowding is that it becomes harder to identify the target 
in the presence of flankers compared to unflanked targets (for reviews, see e.g., Herzog et al. 
2015, Levi, 2008; Whitney et al., 2011). One of the important factors determining the strength 
of this crowding effect is whether the target is ‘grouped’ with the flankers. Visual grouping 
occurs when certain distinct elements in the visual field are perceived as in some way 
‘connected’ and belonging together (e.g., Köhler, 1947; Koffka, 1935; Wertheimer, 1955). An 
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example is shown in fig.3. 
 
Figure 3: an example of grouping. On the left, the central A strongly ‘groups’ with the two close-by letters to 
the left and right but not with the two distant (vertically arranged) letters. Changing the shape and colour of 
the close-by letters changes grouping. On the right, the three vertically arranged As appear more grouped 
than on the left.  
 
Numerous studies have shown that the more the target groups with the flankers, the 
stronger is the effect of crowding, i.e. the more difficult it becomes to identify the target (for 
a review see, Herzog, Sayim, Chicherov, Manassi, 2015). Grouping strength between the 
target and its (directly neighbouring) flankers is often determined by how similar/dissimilar 
their properties are. For example, a black target groups more strongly with black than with 
white flankers, and is harder to identify when it is surrounded by black flankers than by 
white flankers (Kooi, Toet, Tripathy, & Levi, 1994; Sayim, Westheimer, & Herzog, 2008). This 
similarity effect has been shown for a variety of features (e.g., colour: Kooi, Toet, Tripathy, & 
Levi, 1994; Sayim, Westheimer, & Herzog, 2008; Manassi, Sayim, & Herzog, 2012; shape: 
Nazir, 1992; depth: Sayim et al., 2008; Astle, McGovern, & McGraw, 2014). Importantly, 
target-flanker similarity was also correlated with the error rate in crowded letter 
discrimination. The upshot of these results is that the more the target and flanking letters 
were similar, the harder it was to identify the target, i.e., the higher was the error rate 
(Bernard & Chung, 2011). 
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It is reasonable to take the increased difficulty of identifying targets as grouping 
strength increases to indicate increased disruption in the perception of the target. This is 
because crowding itself is due to a perceptual disruption of the target of one kind or 
another, so it is reasonable to assume that an increase in the effects of crowding indicate an 
increase in this disruption. Note that this need not commit us to any one particular theory of 
the mechanisms involved in crowding, we need only claim that the effect is perceptual in at 
least some way. 
It might be argued that grouping changes the decision criterion, for example, by 
introducing a bias by the flankers. Systematic flanker bias has to be considered when the 
flankers contain features that are relevant for observers’ responses. For example, in letter 
identification, flankers that strongly group with the target because of shape similarity could 
bias observers independent of perceptual changes of the target. In such cases, it is advisable 
to distinguish between disruption in the perception of the target and other factors, such as 
flanker bias, for example, by using signal detection theory (see, for example, Sayim & 
Cavanagh, 2013).  
Additionally, there is reason to think that decrease in performance as grouping 
strength increases is mirrored in the phenomenology of the experience, as subjective 
estimates of how much the target ‘stood out’ (i.e., “ungrouped” from the flankers) are 
positively correlated with performance (e.g., Saarela et al., 2009). Furthermore, consider an 
alternative (non-perceptual) explanation of why subjects’ abilities deteriorate as grouping 
increases. Such a view would have to claim that perception of the target remains 
approximately the same as grouping increases, but that subjects’ judgements become 
steadily worse. Such a view is empirically unmotivated and inexplicable on current theories 
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of crowding.  
What’s more, these effects are unsurprising on the view (that Block endorses) that 
crowding is due to ‘excessive feature integration’. On this view, crowding is due to the 
visual system being unable to differentiate between the properties of the target and those of 
the flankers in peripheral vision, which leads to disruption in the conscious perception of 
the target. Given this, it is natural to suppose that the more similar the properties of the 
target and the flankers are, the harder it is for the visual system to differentiate them, and 
thus the more there will be excessive feature integration, and the more conscious perception 
of the target will be disrupted (note, however, that global grouping can trump effects of local 
similarity; e.g., Sayim et al., 2008; Manassi et al., 2012). 
The role of grouping in crowding is highly relevant for the discussion of identity 
crowding. In the standard case of identity crowding - one target letter with two flanking 
letters - target-flanker similarity is maximal (because, of course, the targets and the flankers 
look exactly the same). As a result, target-flanker grouping is extremely strong. Hence (since 
grouping is linked with disruption in the perception of the target) one would assume that 
conscious perception of the target will be maximally disrupted. By contrast, Block’s claim 
(that of conscious seeing without attention) suggests that (in cases of identity crowding) 
perception of the target is superior compared to normal crowding.  
So, assuming that Block accepts that an increase in the strength of target-flanker 
grouping increases the effects of crowding, and thus increases disruption of the conscious 
perception of the target (and given the evidence explained above, it is very difficult to see 
how he could deny this), Block would have to claim that even though perception of the 
target is disrupted more as the target and the flankers get more and more similar, the exact 
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reverse happens when they are identical: the disruptive effects of crowding in the visual 
system become weak, and the target can be consciously perceived and identified. Such a 
reversal of grouping and similarity effects in crowding at physical identity is highly 
implausible and not supported by empirical evidence. To the contrary, an accumulating 
body of studies shows that the relationship between grouping/similarity and crowding 
strength holds for a large range of stimuli, including almost identical targets and flankers 
close to physical similarity. We take these results to count strongly against Block’s claim that 
the identity-crowded target is consciously perceived.  
 
2.2 Attention in Crowding 
Another difficulty for Block’s general view is as follows: Block claims that in cases of 
identity crowding, subjects can consciously see and identify items that they are unable to 
attend to. But this is at odds with evidence suggesting that conscious perception and ease of 
identification of a target in crowding is correlated with how easy it is to pay attention to that 
target. To see this, consider that as grouping becomes stronger, the item in question ‘blends 
in’ more with its surroundings, whilst when grouping is weak, the item ‘stands out’ more. 
The more that an item stands out, the easier it is to direct attention to that item, this is a well 
known phenomenon in visual search (e.g., Nothdurft, 2000; Treisman & Gelade, 1980). 
Several studies showed that discrimination performance of a crowded target goes hand in 
hand with how much the target stands out (or “ungroups”) from the flankers. This was 
shown with objective measures such as reaction time in visual search (e.g., Sayim, 
Westheimer, & Herzog, 2011; Gheri, Morgan, & Solomon, 2007; but see Felisberti, Solomon, 
& Morgan, 2005) and subjective measures (e.g., Saarela et al., 2009; Manassi et. al, 2012). For 
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example, when the target stood out, i.e., was easily attended and efficiently searched, the 
disruptive effects of crowding were reduced compared to when the target did not stand out 
– the success of subjects at the discrimination task and directing attention to the target went 
hand in hand (e.g., Sayim et al., 2011).  
Since Block claims that conscious seeing is possible without attention in crowding, he 
has difficulty explaining why performance is linked so closely to how easy it is to direct 
attention towards crowded items. Block’s opponents have no such problems: they accept 
that there is an explanatory link between conscious seeing and attention, so their view 
would predict that there would be a link between how well subjects perform at these tasks 
and how easy it is to attend to the target, which is precisely what we see. 
3. Evidence in Favour of the Inference View. 
We have argued that grouping and attention effects in crowding tell against Block’s 
interpretation. However, there is still something that remains to be explained: if in identity 
crowding, the target is not consciously seen, how is it that subjects can identify, discriminate 
and differentiate the target, as well as have de re thoughts about it? In this section, we turn to 
this question. We argue that subjects’ (seeming) success can be explained in terms of 
grouping and congruity effects, flanker biases, and prior knowledge. Again, we supply 
evidence for these claims. We argue that the evidence supports Taylor’s version of the 
inference view, and also supports some aspects of Tye’s view.5 
3.1 Grouping and Congruity 
																																								 																				
5	For	reasons	of	space,	we	will	not	be	able	to	discuss	Richards’	view	much	more,	nor	will	we	have	the	space	to	
dispute	Block’s	 criticisms	of	 Richards	 (Block,	 2013b,	 p.	 31).	Of	 course,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 evidence	we	 supply	
does	not	support	Richards’	view	does	not	imply	that	his	view	is	wrong.	
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As we mentioned in §1, Taylor’s view is that subjects identify a flanker, then infer (based on 
the fact that the group of letters as a whole appears congruous, i.e., no item “stands out”) 
that the target is the same as the flankers. Taylor’s claim that subjects can detect properties of 
the group such as ‘congruity’ neatly fits with our discussion of grouping above. As we 
pointed out, subjects are able to make accurate judgements about how much a target ‘blends 
in’ (i.e. groups) with its flankers. These judgements of how much a target ‘blends in’ with 
the group seem very similar to the kinds of judgements about ‘congruity’ that Taylor claims 
subjects can make. Since we know that subjects are capable of making these judgements, it is 
reasonable to assume that they feature in the inferences that allow them to correctly identify 
the crowded item. This will especially be the case when the targets are identical with the 
flankers, as grouping will be maximal, and the group of items will appear maximally 
congruous. Correlations between identification performance and grouping/ congruity 
support this view. 
3.2 Errors and biases in crowding 
In this section we argue that biases and errors to report the identity of the flankers are 
important factors in explaining subjects’ performance in identity crowding. 6  Identity 
crowding is a special case of crowding because reporting a flanker is a correct response. 
Therefore, it is essential to differentiate between responses to the flankers and responses to 
the target. This is particularly important because a common error in crowding is target-
flanker substitution, i.e., reporting a flanker instead of the target (e.g., Strasburger, 2005). 
Substitution errors may account for about 30% of the total error rate in crowding (e.g., 
Strasburger, 2005; Bernard & Chung, 2011).  
																																								 																				
6	Again,	 though	 Taylor	 and	 Tye	 both	 suggest	 possibilities	 similar	 to	 these,	 they	 do	not	 discuss	 any	 evidence	
related	to	them,	as	we	do	here.	
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When target and flankers are different, substitution errors are noticed because 
observers do not correctly report the target. However, this is not the case in identity 
crowding where the target response is ‘correct’ even if the observer identified a flanker. 
What’s more, substitution errors in letter identification were shown to increase as targets and 
flankers get more similar (Bernard & Chung, 2011). Since the targets are identical in 
appearance to the flankers in cases of identity crowding, we would expect substitution 
errors to be rather high. This suggests that the (seemingly) correct identification of the target 
in identity crowding may be partly due to substitution errors, which go unnoticed because 
mistaking a flanker for the target still delivers the ‘correct’ answer. If this were so, it would 
tell against Block’s interpretation that subjects’ reports were due to conscious perception of 
the target. 
In a recent study, Sayim and Cavanagh (2013) used stimuli highly similar to the 
standard identity crowding stimulus and showed that subjects have a tendency to report the 
identity of (grouped) flankers. In these experiments, the stimuli were letters, just as they are 
in Block’s central case. In the first experiment, a target letter T was presented in one of four 
orientations (Figure 4; Sayim & Cavanagh, 2013). Observers indicated the orientation of the 
target. The target was flanked by two sets of flankers. One pair (the horizontal flankers) was 
presented to the sides of the target and always had different orientations from each other 
and the target. The other pair (the vertical flankers) was presented above and below the 
target, and always had the same orientation as each other (see Fig. 4A). 
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Figure 4: A) Observers indicated the orientation of the target T in the centre. When the target had the same 
orientation as the vertical flankers (Grouped condition), performance was better than when the target had a 
different orientation than the vertical flankers (Ungrouped condition). This result is expected if target 
discrimination is superior in identity crowding than in normal crowding. B) Observers indicated if the 
predefined response orientation was presented at the target location (“upright” in the depicted example). 
Sensitivity did not differ between the Matched and Unmatched condition (left panel). However, bias differed 
between the conditions (right panel). Observers indicated that the predefined orientation was present when it 
was not presented more frequently in the Matched than in the Unmatched condition (adapted from Sayim & 
Cavanagh, 2013). Dashed lines indicate results with only Horizontal flankers. 
When the target had the same orientation as the vertical flankers, the three letters 
were the same as in the standard case of identity crowding – three identical letters of the 
same orientation in a row (but vertically rather than horizontally arranged). The results 
showed that the proportion of correct responses was higher when the vertical flankers and 
the target had the same orientation, i.e., when they were identical. This is exactly what 
would be expected if target discrimination is better in identity crowding than in normal 
crowding, and it may initially seem to support Block’s view. However, the experiment did 
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not distinguish between responses to the flankers and responses to the target. For example, if 
observers always indicated the orientation of the vertical flankers, they would be 100% 
correct in the condition where the flankers and the target were the same and 0% correct in 
the condition where they were different. Similarly, in standard identity crowding – 
reporting a flanker is always correctly reporting the target. 
To investigate if a bias to report the flanker orientation underlies the (seemingly) 
better performance when the vertical flankers and the target were identical, in the second 
experiment signal detection theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) was used to separate 
sensitivity (perceiving the target better) and bias (responses driven by non-target sources, 
e.g., the flankers). Observers indicated if the ‘T’ at the target location had an orientation that 
matched the orientation of a ‘T’ they were shown beforehand, the ‘predefined orientation’ 
(e.g., upright in Fig. 4B). If it did, they were instructed to respond ‘present’ and if it did not, 
subjects were to respond ‘absent’, so this is a straightforward Yes/No task. In half of the 
trials, the vertical flankers were of the same orientation as the predefined target orientation 
(the matched condition), in the other half not (the unmatched condition; for more details see 
Sayim and Cavanagh, 2013).  
The important point is this: unlike in the previous experiment (and unlike the 
examples of identity crowding that Block cites) a bias to respond in line with the flankers 
does not improve performance in this case (in the matched condition compared to the 
unmatched condition), so if (contra Block) subjects tend to report “target present” when 
actually only the vertical flankers had the predefined orientation, this experiment would 
reveal that subjects were biased to report the orientation of the vertical flankers. Indeed, that 
is what was found. In the matched compared to the unmatched condition (see fig. 4B, bias 
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results), observers frequently reported that the target was present even though it was not. In 
other words, when the vertical flankers had the same orientation as the predefined one, 
observers falsely reported that the target was of that same orientation. Hence, observers were 
biased to respond in line with the vertical flankers. The vital point is this: the results showed 
that identical flankers did not improve target perception, they merely made subjects more likely to 
report that the target was of the same orientation as the flankers.  
 The result of these two experiments are of major importance for the identity 
crowding debate. Block’s view (conscious seeing without attention) depends on the claim 
that subjects’ reports in identity crowding cases are based upon consciously “seeing” the 
target. This was not the case. Instead, the results showed that targets which are not the same 
as the flankers are often mistakenly seen to be the same as the flankers. So it is clear that 
subjects manifested a tendency to report the orientation of the flankers. Hence, (apparent) 
superior performance in identity crowding compared to normal crowding is likely due to 
this bias imposed by the flankers when they have the same orientation (as well as other 
factors, see below). 
This is bad news for Block, but what about his opponents’ views? Firstly, return to 
Taylor’s view. Taylor claims that subjects identify a flanker, and then infer (based on the fact 
that the group appears congruous) that the identity of the target is the same as that of the 
flanker. If this is so, we would expect subjects to be more likely to report the identity of a 
flanker the more congruous the group of letters is. Strikingly, this is precisely what was 
found. Sayim & Cavanagh (2013, p.9) performed a further experiment, which showed that 
the bias to report the flanker was not maintained when the vertical flankers were not aligned 
with the target (but with the innermost flanker). This suggests that subjects are only biased 
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to report the identity of a flanker when the group of letters are better aligned, and thus are 
more congruous with the target in the centre. This strongly supports Taylor’s view that 
congruity is a powerful factor in making subjects believe that the target letter is the same as 
the flanker letters. Importantly, it also shows that the effect is not a mere response bias, i.e., 
reporting the presence of a particular target orientation simply because that orientation is 
frequent in the entire stimulus. 
Now, compare this with Tye’s view. We do not endorse Tye’s claim that in all cases of 
identity crowding, subjects do only see two letters.7 Tye’s account is at odds with the fact 
that in crowding, subjects are typically able to tell whether a target is absent or not, which is 
difficult to explain if all subjects saw was two letters (Levi, Hariharan, & Klein, 2002; Livne 
& Sagi, 2007; Pelli, Palomares, & Majaj, 2004).8 On Taylor’s interpretation, there is no such 
problem, since Taylor allows that subjects have a conscious representation of a group of 
letters, subjects would be able to use information about the size and shape of this group to 
determine whether there were three items there or two, and thus detect the presence or 
absence of a target (cf. Taylor 2013, p.22)9. For this reason, we prefer Taylor’s view to Tye’s. 
Tye is nonetheless correct that bias to report a flanker is an important factor.  
Block (2013a, p.175 and 2014, p.162) argues that the identity crowding results cannot 
be explained in terms of subjects simply identifying the flankers and reporting them. He 
cites an experiment (Petrov and Popple, 2007) where three Gabor patches were presented 
																																								 																				
7	However,	we	will	not	debate	the	claim	that	subjects	sometimes	only	perceive	two	letters,	we	only	claim	that	
this	view	has	difficulty	applying	across	the	board	and	(as	we	shall	show)	advocates	of	the	inference	thesis	do	
not	need	to	make	the	extreme	claim	that	Tye	does,	as	the	data	can	be	accommodated	for	in	other	ways.	
8	Block	(2014,	p.164)	claims	that	Tye’s	view	is	also	phenomenologically	implausible.	However,	as	such	disputes	
are	notoriously	difficult	to	adjudicate,	and	because	we	do	not	need	to	take	a	stand	on	this,	we	will	discuss	it	no	
further	here.	
9	Note	that	knowledge	about	the	stimulus	may	strongly	shape	the	outcome	of	an	identity	crowding	experiment	
(see	also	3.3.).	For	example,	comparing	the	relative	size	of	two	stimuli	when	knowing	that	there	are	either	two	
or	three	elements,	is	easier	than	indicating	the	absolute	number	of	items	without	any	comparisons.		
		 19	
peripherally, with each Gabor slanted left or right. Block notes that subjects performed with 
96% accuracy when the Gabors were uniformly slanted (///) but only 53% accurately when 
the middle Gabor was differently slanted left (/\/). Block takes this to show that results in 
identity crowding cannot simply be based on subjects’ identification of the flankers (2013a). 
Furthermore, Block notes that other asymmetries, such as 72% correct responses in the (\/\) 
case vs only 53% correct responses in the (/\/) case in normal crowding ‘can only be 
explained perceptually’ (2013b, p.31).   
Start with the asymmetry between the (///) case and the case when the central Gabor 
is tilted to a different orientation from its flankers, such as (/\/). This is clearly the 
asymmetry that is more directly relevant to identity crowding, as in this case one of the sets 
of stimuli are identity crowded. Subjects’ (apparently) superior performance in the (///) case 
can easily be explained in terms of the mechanisms we have already outlined. In the (///) 
case, subjects’ accidentally reporting the orientation of one of the flankers (‘flanker 
substitution’) would go unnoticed, and be recorded as a ‘correct’ judgement, but this would 
not go unnoticed in the (/\/) case, so this will contribute to the apparently higher 
performance in the (///) case. Similarly, it is often assumed that in crowding, subjects can 
detect the presence of features of the stimuli, but cannot detect the location at which the 
features appear, which would again result in uncertainty about the orientation of the target 
and the flankers in the (/\/) case but not in the (///) case. Finally, we have already pointed 
out that subjects are more likely to report the identity of a flanker when the group appears 
congruous (as predicted by Taylor, see also Sayim and Cavanagh 2013, p.9). Since congruity 
is maximal in the (///) case, we would expect subjects to be most likely to report the identity 
of flankers in this case. These factors can easily account for subjects’ apparently superior 
		 20	
performance in the (///) case, as opposed to the (/\/) case. 
Turn now to the other asymmetry: subjects give 72% correct responses in the (\/\) 
case as opposed to 53% in the (/\/) case. Neither of these are cases of identity crowding, so it 
is difficult to see why this asymmetry should support Block’s case that the middle item is 
consciously seen in the case of identity crowding. Block does not connect this case with 
identity crowding specifically, rather he seems to use it only to establish a more modest 
claim, which is that crowding effects in general can only be explained in terms of perception 
(2013b, p.31). Furthermore, in response to Taylor, Block concedes that ‘Taylor is right that 
these asymmetries show only that the abilities I appealed to must be at least partially 
perceptual’ (2013b, p.31. Our emphasis. See also his 2014 p.162).  
Block’s claim that these asymmetries are to be explained partly perceptually is quite 
modest, and we can agree with it. After all, our explanation of the asymmetries between 
identity crowding and normal crowding rely explicitly on subjects’ conscious perception of 
the group of letters as a whole, and perceptual experience of the flankers, as well as 
congruity and uniformity properties. Furthermore, these conscious perceptual experiences 
will of course be underwritten by some unconscious perceptual processes.10 So, we are 
happy to agree that the asymmetry between these two cases of normal crowding can be 
explained partially perceptually as well. 
As Block notes, the mechanism underlying the (\/\) vs (/\/) asymmetry is not well 
understood (2013b, p.31) so we will not take a stand on this issue here. However, our view is 
compatible with a wide range of proposed explanations of this phenomenon. For example, 
Petrov and Popple speculate that we may be able to explain the asymmetry in terms of optic 
																																								 																				
10	We	will	expand	on	this	point	about	unconscious	perception	in	§4.	
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flow and saccadic eye movements (2007, p.5). Block himself notes this as a possible 
explanation (2013b, p.31). We do not commit to this view here, but nothing we have said is 
inconsistent with it.  
3.3 Effects of knowledge  
In identity crowding illustrations, observers know that they are looking at an example of 
identity crowding. Hence, they know in advance that, for example, three letters are 
presented. Without gaze contingent presentation, (presentation of the stimulus only when 
the observer keeps fixation at a particular point away from the stimulus), or very short 
presentation times, it is difficult to prevent observers from directly looking at the stimulus. 
Hence, prior knowledge either about the entire stimulus or the flanker identity is likely to 
occur and have an effect in identity crowding. 
This has been shown in a variety of experiments. Zhang et al. (2009) showed that if 
subjects have prior knowledge of the set of items the target and flankers were drawn from, 
then superior performance was observed compared to conditions in which the set was not 
known before the experiment. Similarly, if subjects are cued with an item in the fovea, and 
then are made to scrutinize a crowded target for that item, success increased when the cued 
item was the same as the target (Sayim et al., 2014)11. This effect of prior knowledge even 
occurs with extremely complex crowded stimuli, such as abstract paintings (Sayim, Myin, & 
Van Uytven, 2015).  
It is likely that subjects can reach conclusions about the identity crowded stimuli 
based upon these knowledge effects. As observers know the target in identity crowding 
																																								 																				
11	Note	 that	 simultaneous	 presentation	 of	 the	 foveal	 item	 and	 the	 stimulus	 showed	 a	 stronger	 effect	 than	
presenting	 the	 foveal	 item	 before	 the	 stimulus,	 indicating	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 target-flanker	 grouping	 was	
stronger	than	cueing.	
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because they can directly look at them, conclusions about the identity of the target are 
influenced by this prior knowledge. Having prior knowledge will obviously make the 
question of what the target letter is very easy. Again, this suggests another explanation of 
subjects’ abilities, other than conscious perception of the target 
3.4 Subjects’ abilities: conclusions. 
We have discussed empirical results which indicate that the (seemingly) better performance 
in identity crowding can be attributed to several factors without invoking the conscious 
perception view. These factors include the regularity of the group of letters, i.e., the lack of 
“standing out” of the target (leading subjects to make inferences based upon ‘congruity’ 
properties of the group), in conjunction with identification of a flanker, biases to report the 
identity of the flankers and knowledge of the stimulus. We claim that it is some variety of 
these factors that accounts for subjects’ performance in identity crowding. What’s more, 
unlike Block’s other opponents, we have supported this claim with a large range of 
empirical evidence. 
4. Summary statistics and the phenomenology of crowding. 
In this section we consider some additional arguments that Block uses to support the 
conscious perception hypothesis. Block (2013b, pp.32-36) refers to an experiment that 
applied a texture synthesis algorithm to images to produce new ‘scrambled’ images which 
should be indiscernible from the original, when both images are viewed in peripheral vision 
(Balas et al. 2009). 12  These scrambled images are called ‘mongrels’.  
																																								 																				
12	See	 Portilla	 and	 Simoncelli	 (2000),	 Simoncelli	 and	 Portilla	 (1998)	 and	 Freeman	 and	 Simoncelli	 (2011)	 for	
more	on	these	algorithms.	
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Figure 5: From Block (2013b, p.35): John Wiley and Sons, Inc. Reproduced with Permission. Block credits Ruth 
Rosenholtz with creation of the image. 
Fig.5 shows the results of applying the mongrelisation algorithm to stimuli used in 
identity crowding: the original image is shown in the top left, and each of the other images is 
a different result of the application of the mongrelisation algorithm to the original image. 
Balas et al. suggest (albeit tentatively) that the perceptual system may represent stimuli 
viewed in the periphery using a process similar to this mongrelisation algorithm (2009, 
pp.11-14). 
When discussing the summary statistics data, it is important to separate the different 
points that Block makes. The first is to do with binding. Block notes that in many of the 
mongrels, the middle letter is recognizable as an upright ‘T’. He then concludes that: 
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‘[t]hese figures suggest that the visual system can sometimes bind features to some 
objects in peripheral vision so long as the objects are all the same’ (2013b, pp.35-36). 
We are happy to accept that the visual system can bind features in peripheral vision. 
However, it is well known that perceptual binding can occur in the absence of consciousness 
(Dehaene et al. 2004), so the presence of binding does not tell us whether perception of the 
object is conscious. In crowding generally, the view that crowded targets which cannot be 
discerned are nevertheless processed by the visual system and affect perception and 
behavior, is well supported by empirical results (He et al., 1996, Yeh, He, & Cavanagh, 2012, 
Kouider, Berthet, & Faivre, 2011, Faivre & Kouider, 2011). Though these studies did not 
concern identity crowding, they do show that unconscious perception of crowded items 
occurs, and so we see no reason to resist the claim that it may occur in the case of identity 
crowding. Similar things go for Block’s claim (based on Burge, 2010) that unconscious seeing 
and conscious seeing form a natural kind (2013a, p.180 and 2014, p.161). 13 We are happy to 
accept all of these points, we simply deny that the target is consciously perceived.14  
Crucially for our purposes, Block extends this discussion in an attempt to 
demonstrate that the middle letter is consciously represented, at least sometimes. Block 
argues that we have good reason to think that the phenomenology of seeing the ‘TTT’ stimulus 
in peripheral vision is accurately represented by the different mongrels in fig.2, saying that: 
																																								 																				
13	Block	 further	 claims	 that	 in	 identity	 crowding,	 our	 perception	 of	 the	 target	 involves	 a	 ‘singular	 element’	
(2013b,	 p.36).	 A	 singular	 element	 is	 part	 of	 the	 content	 of	 a	 perceptual	 episode	 that	 represents	 the	
individuality	of	the	percept,	the	fact	that	the	percept	is	a	particular	(Burge	2009,	p.287).	Again,	we	are	happy	
to	 accept	 this,	 but	 we	 claim	 that	 singular	 elements	 are	 unconscious	 in	 the	 identity	 crowding	 case.	 Burge	
himself	agrees	that	singular	elements	can	be	present	in	unconscious	perceptual	episodes	(2010).	
14	This	point	also	applies	to	an	argument	for	a	similar	conclusion	that	Block	bases	on	Freeman	and	Pelli	(2007),	
where	 subjects	 were	 just	 as	 good	 in	 performance	 at	 a	 change-detection	 task	 when	 the	 cued	 items	 were	
crowded	letters,	as	when	they	were	uncrowded	ones.	Block	takes	this	to	imply	that	perception	in	crowding	is	
object-perception	(2013b,	p.36)	and	that	a	Burgean	‘singular	element’	is	present	in	crowded	perception	(2014,	
p.161.	See	also	Block	2013a,	pp.178-182).	As	above,	we	will	not	dispute	these	claims,	we	simply	claim	that	all	
of	this	is	unconscious	perception.	
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‘the mongrelisation algorithms are designed to reproduce the conscious qualities of 
peripheral vision… there is reason to think that the mongrelisation process is telling 
us about conscious vision’ (2013b, p.37. Cf. 2014, p.162). 15  
If we accept Block’s claim that the phenomenology of identity crowding is accurately 
captured by the mongrels, then (since some of the mongrels contain a clear middle letter ‘T’) 
we have good reason to accept that the middle ‘T’ is represented in consciousness, at least 
sometimes.  
This argument hinges on accepting that the mongrels accurately represent the 
phenomenology of peripheral vision. However, we do not think that Block is warranted in 
drawing this conclusion from the Balas et al. data, for two reasons: firstly, the claim that 
mongrels are a good representation of what the original would look like when viewed 
peripherally is based on an experiment that involved exposing two different groups of 
subjects to different stimuli, and asking them to identify the stimuli. One group viewed the 
original images in peripheral vision, whilst the other viewed mongrels in foveal vision. The 
correlation of performance between the tasks was taken as the indication that the mongrel 
accurately ‘matched’ what the original would look like in peripheral vision. However, it 
simply doesn’t follow from the fact that performance at an identification task was the same 
in both cases that the phenomenology of the original in peripheral vision is the same as that 
of the mongrel in foveal vision. More generally, the experiment that Block describes is put 
forward extremely tentatively by Rosenholtz and her colleagues, as is the method outlined 
above for ‘matching’ mongrels with original images. We would require far more converging 
evidence before we accepted that mongrels are an accurate portrayal of the phenomenology 
																																								 																				
15	Simoncelli	 and	Portilla	 themselves	note	 that	whether	 the	algorithm	 is	 reproducing	 the	phenomenology	of	
conscious	vision	is	in	need	of	experimental	verification	using	‘subjective	measurements’	(1998,	p.4).	
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of peripheral vision. Balas et al. themselves typically claim that the mongrels accurately 
capture ‘the information available to the visual system under conditions of crowding’ (2009, 
p.10), so it is unclear whether they are making a claim about phenomenology, as Block does.  
Secondly, (and, we think, devastatingly) for any one original image, there are infinite 
possible mongrels. As you can see from fig.5, some of them involve a central letter, and 
others do not. So even if we do assume that some of the mongrels accurately represent how 
the original image appears in peripheral vision, we have no reason to think that this includes 
the mongrels that contain the middle letter. Block could argue that a high proportion of the 
set of possible mongrels include a middle letter. However, the problem is that whether or 
not this is true, there is still nothing forcing Block’s opponents into accepting that the 
phenomenology of identity crowding resembles any of these particular mongrels (or even 
any mongrels at all). Moreover, it is not sufficient to claim that a high proportion of the 
stimuli contain the (correct) middle letter because the important aspect is that the proportion 
should be higher than that for “normally” crowded targets under similar conditions.  
Drawing on suggestions by Balas et al. (2009, p.5), Block (2013b, p.35) notes that 
when we view items in conditions of crowding, our perception of crowded items may shift 
between the different possible mongrels in figure 5. He agrees with Balas et al. when they 
say: 
‘this may be the explanation for the shifting and dynamic percept many observers 
experience when attending to their peripheral vision’ (2009, p.5). 
However, this point cannot establish that the mongrels accurately represent the 
phenomenology of crowding. Firstly, it is unclear whether the phenomenology of crowding 
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really is ‘shifting and dynamic’. If we know anything about crowding, it is that its 
phenomenology is extremely hard to put one’s finger on. Secondly, even if we accept this 
description of the phenomenology, we need not accept that it is due to changes which 
correlate with different images akin to the different mongrels. Such ‘dynamic’ 
phenomenology may be as a result of subtle shifts in attention to the group of items: it is 
well known that attention to items can change their perceived appearance (e.g. Carrasco et al. 
2004 and Tse, 2005).  
We must now discuss a pilot study that Block mentions (2013b, pp.35-36). Some 
applications of the algorithm result in crowded stimuli that contain letters that are inverted 
relative to the original image. Block notes that if we take seriously the claim that the 
mongrelization algorithms accurately represent what is happening in cases of crowding then 
this will predict that subjects should find it difficult to discern mongrel stimuli with inverted 
letters from original stimuli without such inversions. Balas et al. performed a pilot 
experiment which shows that subjects have difficulty telling apart a set of stimuli containing 
upright A’s from one containing an inverted A under crowding (2009, p.11).  
However, the pilot study cannot support any substantial claims about whether the 
mongrels accurately represent the phenomenology of peripheral vision.17 The first important 
point is that the study was only a pilot study. For example, there were no baseline 
measurements, no control conditions, and it was a null finding (chance performance). To our 
knowledge, a full version of this experiment has not been performed, so we cannot draw 
any firm conclusions from it. 
																																								 																				
17	Importantly,	Balas	et	al.	themselves	do	not	claim	that	it	does.		
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In any case, this is only a discrimination task, and as a result is subject to certain 
limitations. Even if a full experiment were carried out, the most we could conclude from a 
discrimination task such as this would be that (whatever the phenomenology of the 
experience of the original and the experience of the mongrel were like) it was hard for 
subjects to tell them apart. This is, of course, what would be expected if the mongrelisation 
algorithm was working properly. However, the inability of subjects to discern a set of 
upright ‘A’s from a set containing an inverted one can only tell you that subjects find the 
two sets of stimuli difficult to discern. We cannot draw from this any conclusions about 
what the phenomenology of either set of stimuli actually was like. It tells us nothing about 
what the phenomenological appearance of each one was to the subject. So we are not 
entitled to draw any firm conclusions about the phenomenal appearance of either set of 
letters, which is what would be required for Block’s argument to hold up. Of course, we are 
not expressing scepticism about the general possibility of using introspective measures to 
establish the phenomenology of crowding,18 we are simply pointing out the limitations of 
discrimination tasks such as this one. 
5. Conclusion 
Before drawing any firm conclusions about identity crowding, it is important to examine all 
of the available evidence. In this paper, we have argued that Block’s interpretation of the 
crowding data is untenable. Though we have disagreed with Block’s view, we are in 
complete agreement with him that crowding generally (and identity crowding particularly) 
provides a rich source of insights about attention and its relationship to consciousness, and 
																																								 																				
18	For	example,	Sayim	and	Wagemans	(2013)	use	a	paradigm	on	which	subjects	are	asked	to	draw	the	crowded	
items	(see	also	Coates,	Wagemans,	&	Sayim,	in	press).	There	is	good	reason	to	think	that	this	gives	us	a	better	
insight	into	the	phenomenology	of	crowding	than	simple	discrimination	tasks.	
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we are confident that much that is philosophically and scientifically interesting remains to 
be learned from interdisciplinary discussion of these issues.19 
  
																																								 																				
19	The	 authors	 would	 like	 to	 thank	 Chris	 Mole,	 Bence	 Nanay,	 an	 anonymous	 referee	 and	 the	 editor	 for	
comments	previous	drafts	of	the	paper.	Thanks	also	to	Ned	Block	for	helpful	conversation.	Henry	Taylor	would	
like	to	thank	the	Leverhulme	Trust	and	Isaac	Newton	Trust	for	an	Early	Career	Fellowship	(ECF-2015-088)	that	
provided	 support	 while	 the	 paper	 was	 being	 written.	 Thanks	 also	 to	 the	 Royal	 Institute	 of	 Philosophy	 for	
providing	a	Jacobsen	Fellowship	whilst	research	for	the	paper	was	carried	out.	Bilge	Sayim	was	supported	by	
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